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The interest which a possessor of property has in its exclusive
possession is of sufficient importance to give him a privilege to
use force to protect it from unprivileged intrusion. The amount
of force which a possessor of property may use to exclude or
expel an unprivileged intruder, varies with the nature of the
intrusion and the resistance which the intruder makes to the
possessor's effort to exclude or expel him. If the intrusion ob-
viously threatens no harm either to the physical condition of the
property or to the bodily security of its possessor and those who
occupy it or use it with his permission, the possessor is privileged
to use only the mildest of force except to overcome the intruder's
resistance to his exclusion or expulsion.2 If, on the other hand, the
intrusion is such as to give the possessor reasonable ground to
believe that it will cause death or serious bodily harm to him or
to those occupying or using the property with his permission,
he may prevent or terminate it by a force which is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury to the intruder,
'The term "intruder" is used to describe one who enters upon premises,
or meddles with a chattel which is in the possession of another without
the other's consent. The term "trespasser" includes only those who enter
or meddle not only without the consent of the possessor, but also without
some privilege of their own to do so. It is convenient to have a particular
word to indicate the fact that the person entering premises or meddling
with a chattel is doing so without the possessor's consent, irrespective of
whether the entering or meddling is, or is not, privileged.
2 The phrase moliter mnanus imposuit, as used in the old forms of plead-
ing, indicates the limitation on this privilege to expel intruders. Collitzn v.
Renison (1754, K. B.) 1 Sayer, 138.
[525)
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if his intrusion cannot be otherwise prevented or terminated.,
The possessor is required to warn the intruder to desist from his
intrusion before he is privileged to use any force, unless such a
warning would be obviously futile or would be dangerous to the
life or property of the possessor or those who are upon the prem-
ises or using the chattel with his permission. 4
The possessor, if present at the time and place of intrusion,
may protect his property and yet make these fine discriminations.
But it is often practically impossible for a possessor of property
to protect it from intrusion in person or by deputy. Whether
the property be real or personal, its possessor cannot always be
expected to be in occupation or custody of it. If the property
is an extensive tract of land, the possessor, even if he is occupying
it, is obviously incapable of patrolling its boundaries in person
or by deputy so constantly as to be always at every point at which
an intruder may enter. Therefore, if the property is to be pro-
tected from intrusion, it must be by some means other than
human beings. But any such method of protection, whether by
barriers, mechanical devices, or animals, is incapable of making
those discriminations which the owner or his deputy, were he
present, would be required to make and of giving a warning
which the owner would often be required to give. A barbed wire
fence, spiked railing, or spring gun cannot distinguish between
a lawful visitor and an unprivileged intruder, and even a watch-
dog is capable of recognizing only the most frequent of lawful
visitors. Such a means of protection may therefore be expected
to operate not only against those whom the possessor.is privileged
forcibly to exclude or expel, but also against those whose entry
the possessor could not resist or terminate by any force, however
small. Nor can these means of protection choose the precise de-
gree of force which is appropriate to resist the particular intrusion
threatened or give the warning which the possessor is often re-
quired to give before applying force.
In every privilege given for the protection of any of the actor's
interests, a sharp distinction is drawn between the conditions
3 Bray v. State (1918) 16 Ala. App. 433, 78 So. 463. Despite the frequent
statements by text writers that "a man's house is his castle", from which
phrase they deduce the broad rule that a homicide committed to prevent
an unlawful entry into one's castle is "justified", it is clear that the use of
dangerous weapons is privileged only if the actor reasonably fears for
the safety of the life or limb of himself or of some inmate of his house
[State v. Mills (1908, Del.) 6 Penn. 497, 69 Atl. 841; State v. Taylor (1897)
143 Mo. 150, 44 S. W. 785; Stoneman v. Commonwealth (1874, Va.) 25
Gratt. 887; State v. Patterson (1873) 45 Vt. 308], or, in some jurisdictions,
if the intrusion is or is reasonably believed to be for the purpose of commit-
ting a felony although it is not one involving any such danger. Thompson
v. State (1901) 61 Neb. 210, 85 N. W. 62.
4 Polkinhorn v. Wright (1845) 8 Q. B. 197; of. Harrison v. Harrison
(1871) 43 Vt. 417. See Cooley, Torts (2d ed. 1888) 194.
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that create a privilege to use force which, while intended or likely
to cause some substantial bodily injury, does not threaten death
or "serious" bodily injury and the conditions which create a privi-
lege to use force threatening such grave results.5 Admittedly the
distinction between "substantial" and "serious" bodily injury is
far from definite and clear-cut." It is easy to distinguish merely
trivial harm from serious bodily injury; but it is also easy to
imagine injuries which are difficult to classify as being substantial
or serious.7 To object, however, to a distinction based upon so
vague a classification would be to hold objectionable not only a
vast number of distinctions which are admittedly valid in the
law of torts, but also distinctions which are valid in other fields
of law. In the law of torts much must necessarily be left to the
common sense and judgment of court and jury, whose function
it is to administer the necessarily vague general principles of
tort law and to reduce them, sometimes perhaps in rather a hap-
hazard fashion, to that particularity necessary for their appli-
cation to the infinitely varying circumstances which come before
courts for decision.' Not only is this distinction recognized by
the law of torts in determining the existence of the majority of
privileges to invade intentionally legally protected interests of
personality; but it has been sanctioned by its adoption in statu-
tory enactments, and its validity in this particular field is attested
by the fact that it was expressly recognized in the English Act2
which forbade the use of mechanical devices such as spring guns
'Thus, in resisting a "simple" assault, the actor may use reasonable
force but may not use force dangerous to life or limb [Cool. v. Beal (1697,
K. B.) 1 Ld. Raym. 1761, although he may do so if an attack involves a
similar danger to him. Green v. Commzonwealth (1918) 122 Va. 862, 94
S. E. 940. So, too, one may resist an unlawful arrest but is not privileged
to do so by a "deadly" weapon even though the arrest can be prevented
in no other way. Coats v. State (1911) 101 Ark. 51, 141 S. W. 197;
State v. Meyers (1910) 57 Or. 50, 110 Pac. 407; State r. Clai: (1900) 04
W. Va. 625, 63 S. E. 402; Noles v. State (1855) 26 Ala. 31. But see
Simrmermarn v. State (1883) 14 Neb. 568, 17 N. W. 115; and see Wharton,
Homicide (2d ed. 1878) see. 227.
6 Compare Lawlor v. People (1874) 74 Il. 228 and Sdres v. Boggess
(1913) 72 W. Va. 109, 77 S. E. 542 with Acc;'s v. Unitecd States (1890) 164
U. S. 388; Rex v. Akeenhead (1816, C. P.) Holt N. P. Cas. 409; and see
State v. Kakarikos (1915) 45 Utah, 470, 146 Pac. 750; Rogcra v. State
(1894) 60 Ark. 76, 29 S. W. 894; People r. Troy (1893) 96 Mich. 530, 537,
56 N. W. 102, 104.
Compare Murphy v. State (1894) 43 Neb. 34, 61 N. W. 491 with
Srnith v. State (1899) 58 Neb. 531, 78 N. W. 1059; and see Rex v. Coz
(1818) R. & R. Cr. Cas. 362; and State r. Davis (1913) 72 Wash. 2G1,
130 Pac. 95.
* See Bohlen, Mixed Qztestions of Law and Fact (1924) 73 U. PA. L.
RFV. 111.
9 (1827) 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 18, repealed and later substantially reenacted
(1861) 24 and 25 Vict. c. 95, sec. 1; and c. 100, sec. 31.
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except for the protection of dwelling houses, and then only upon
adequate notice.
Apart from this authority, it would seem clear that no interest
which is merely one of property can be equal or superior to the
interest which both the individual and society have in life and
limb. If we look no further than to the individuals concerned,
the value of the two interests are grossly disproportionate. If
the interest of society is taken into. account, as it must be, it is
clear that society has a vital interest in the efficiency of its cit-
izens both as fighting men and workers, which is clearly different
in kind and not merely in degree from that which it has in the
preservation of property from intrusion and even from harm or
destruction.
Any discriminating means of protecting property from intru-
sion may therefore be roughly divided into those which, while
intended to cause some bodily harm, are neither intended nor
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, and those which
are intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.
Watchdogs differ greatly in size and. ferocity and therefore may
fall within either class.
The consideration of the responsibility of a possessor using
indiscriminating means of protecting his property is therefore
divided into three parts; the first dealing with the use of barriers
and mechanical devices which threaten less than serious bodily
injury; the second, the use of mechanical devices which threaten
serious bodily injury or death; and the third, the use of watch-
dogs. 10
I
It is universally admitted that ordinary walls and fences, even
so high that persons attempting to scale them may be injured if
they fall therefrom, are privileged means of protecting property
from intrusion, but such barriers are generally insufficient pro-
tection against determined intrusion. Therefore, additional
protection is often added by placing broken glass on the top of
a wall, putting spikes upon railings, or making a fence of barbed
wire. Such additional safeguards contain an actual probability
of inflicting upon intruders injuries which the possessor, were
he present in person, could inflict only on rare occasions, and upon
a comparatively small number of trespassers; and they always
operate without that immediate warning which the possessor
must give, save in exceptional cases, before acting. Such bar-
riers may affect not only deliberate intruders, irrespective of the
purpose and circumstances of their intrusion, but they may also,
although far less probably, affect persons who come upon the
10 This last division will be treated in a separate article, the present
article dealing only with the first two.
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premises at the occupier's invitation or permission or in the ex-
ercise of a privilege of their own. There is at least a slight
chance that a dangerous fence or railing may affect the safety
of persons who come in contact with it while in the lawful use of
adjacent property, or by some unavoidable or childish deviation
while lawfully traveling upon an adjoining highway. There is
also a possibility that these devices may injure cattle lawfully
straying or being driven on the highway.
No case, either English or American, decides or even in-
timates that an owner of property is liable to a trespasser who
is injured by coming in contact with such a barrier, no matter
how harmless may be his intrusion. In the one American case"
in which the question is presented for decision, it was held that
an owner of land who, to protect it from being used as a short-
cut, had erected thereon a barbed wire fence, was not liable to
a person who was injured by it while attempting to cross the
owner's property without his permission.
Trespassers are the very persons whose intrusions such dan-
gerous barriers are intended to deter and resist. In so far as
concerns trespassers whatever their purpose, the action of such
devices differ from that of a human guardian in that they are in-
capable of gauging the exact amount of force which it is permis-
sible to apply to the various classes of trespassers who may
intrude, and in that they cannot give the warning to desist from
the intrusion which a human being is generally required to give
immediately before acting. There is, therefore, the certainty
that they will act without warning and the chance that they will
inflict upon merely harmless trespassers an injury which is
slightly in excess of that which under the actual, or even under
the apparent circumstances, the possessor or his human deputy
would be privileged to inflict.
In the daytime spiked railings and barbed wire fences carry
their own warning unless concealed, as for example, by a hedge.
Broken glass on a high wall may not be noticed by a trespasser
until he places his hand upon it and is injured by it. Neither are
spiked railings nor barbed wire fences visible at night. But if
such walls, fences and railings are customary, as they are in many
localities, a trespasser, though he may not know of their exist-
ence, knows that they may exist. To trespassers by night, the
21 Quigley v. Clough (1899) 173 Blass. 429, 53 N. E. 884. Holmes,
J., says, "Barbed wire is well known and has been widely used for fencing
as more efficient than common wire. . . . It is and has been a common
article of commerce and the use of it simply shows an intent to mahe it
more difficult to pass the line of fence."
By statute in Massachusetts it is provided that "No barbed wire fence
shall be built or maintained within six feet above the ground along any
sidewalk located on or upon any public street or highway". See Mass. Gen.
Laws, 1921, ch. 86, sec. 6.
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notoriety of their customary use supplies the place of knowledge
which trespassers by day obtain by their senses.12 Not only
does the knowledge of the existence of such fences or railings,
or the knowledge that they are customarily used and so may be
expected, serve as a warning in advance, which may well be taken
to supply the place of the warning which the occupier must gen-
erally give immediately before acting, but it has a further value.
It acts as a deterrent to all but the most persistent of trespassers
who are willing to take a chance of the slight injury rather than
abandon the purpose to violate the occupier's property rights.
It also goes to show that the owner's purpose is not to injure tres-
passers when they intrude, but to protect his property not only
by the resistance which these fences and wires make to unauthor-
ized entry, but by the deterrent force which they will exercise.
If the device is not customary, it would seem that at least as far
as concerns responsibility to a person injured while trespassing,
the occupier must take at least all reasonable steps to bring home
notice of its use to all those persons whom he has reason to ex-
pect to trespass upon his property. Unless such notice is given,
the device can have no deterrent effect; and the failure to give
such a notice, if it be deliberate, tends to show that the purpose
in installing it is not merely to prevent intrusion but in part at
least to injure such persons as may intrude.
The injury which such barriers can do is, after all, not severe
and is therefore only slightly in excess of that which the occupier
could personally or by deputy inflict upon even a harmless tres-
passer. The slight chance of the deterrent force of the knowl-
edge of the existence of the fence, or of the knowledge that
such fences are customary and therefore to be expected, will
12 If the device is unusual, the occupier is so far privileged to use it
that he is not liable to intruders if the injury which it is intended or
likely to inflict is less than death or serious bodily injury, and is not dis-
proportionately great as compared with the value of the property in-
terest which the device is necessary to protect, and a reasonably sufficient
warning of its use is brought home to all those likely to intrude and
thereby come in contact with it.
In so far as concerns persons lawfully upon premises or traveling upon
highways upon which the premises abut, the absence of warning goes
principally to show that the device is not a reasonable or proper means
of protecting the property. So far as adult travelers are concerned, knowl-
edge of the device would be of no avail to them, since the owner is not
liable to them no matter what the condition of his property unless the
travelers' deviation thereon is accidental and unintentional. A warning
may be of some value as a deterrent and so a protection to children who
are entitled to protection from dangers which their immaturity prevents
them from observing, even during a deliberate but expectable deviation.
And an adjoining owner is entitled to such a warning of even the most
necessary and reasonable conditions on the premises, so that he may take
the necessary precautions to minimize their danger to his use of his own
property.
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be insufficient to prevent trespasses. Furthermore, the chance
that a trespasser who is willing to run the risk involved
in such barriers will be a harmless trespasser against whom the
possessor is privileged to use only the slightest force is so slight
as compared with the practical importance of otherwise protect-
ing the property from intrusion that it seems entirely proper for
courts to permit, as they do, the use of such means of protection
without responsibility to any class of trespassers for the slightly
excessive injury which they may occasionally inflict.
There is no case which even discusses the liability of an oc-
cupier who protects his property by such barriers to persons
coming in contact with these devices while entering the premises
by his invitation or permission, or in the exercise of a privilege
of their own to enter irrespective of his consent. This fact shows
the extreme improbability that one entering premises at the pos-
sessor's invitation or with his permission, or even in pursuance
of a custom, local or general, such as is often held to confer a
privilege analogous to the license given by express consent, will
be affected by such barriers. A person entering another's prem-
ises, whether by invitation and for the purpose of the owner's
business, or by permission and for his own purposes, is entitled
to be informed of only such dangers as lurk in that part of the
premises which is included within the area of his license; and
unless permission is given to climb a fence or scale a wall or
railing, a licensee, whether by invitation, permission or local cus-
tom, is entitled to enter only at those points which the owner
has caused or permitted to appear to be the prepared approaches
to his premises.'3
13 Gardner v. Roland (1842, N. C.) 2 Ired. 247; see Bedell v. Bcrkcy
(1889) 76 Blich. 435, 439, 43 N. W. 308. In Mazcy v. Lorcland (1916) 103
Minn. 210, 158 N. W. 44, the plaintiff, who had come to the defendants
residence on business and at his invitation, on leaving attempted to ero-3
the lawn to reach her automobile instead of leaving by the walk leading
to the street, and was injured by tripping over a wire stretched at the
height of two feet from the ground, for the purpose of protecting the
lawn from being used as a short-cut.
The court in its opinion incidentally states that "the prezence of the
wire was not inherently dangerous, and that such barriers are usual and
frequently erected in this or some other form to prevent passage over
private lawns", but bases its decision in favor of the defendant upon the
fact that "from the moment the plaintiff abandoned the ordinary e:dt and
chose to cross the lawn, she became a mere licensee." A part of the
opinion seems to deny the existence of any duty to warn a mere licensce
of a danger of which the owner is aware, but in a later part of the opinion
attention is called to the fact that "it was not so dark that the wire could
not have been seen by the exercise of ordinary care, and the facts shovn
in the record are not sufficient to justify the conclusion that the defendant
(who was present) kmew, or had any reason to believe, that if the plain-
tiff continued to cross the lawn, she was at all liable to trip or fall over
the wire." The case, therefore, goes no further than to hold that an
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One entering in pursuance of a privilege is entitled at most to
find the ordinary approaches safe for his entry.14 Such persons
therefore, if they choose to enter at unusual places, are outside
the area of their' license or privilege and are therefore as much
trespassers as though they had no license or privilege. 15 No case
has arisen in which a prepared entrance has been blocked by
dangerous barriers. If such a case should arise, it would seem
that the owner should be liable unless he brought home to the
licensee or privileged entrant this unusual method of protecting
his property.
Where human Deings or livestock lawfully traveling upon an
adjoining highway come in contact with the fences or railing by
some expectable and innocent deviation, there appears at first
glance an analogy to the numerous cases in which it is held that
a possessor of property who maintains an excavation or other
dangerous condition immediately adjacent to an adjoining high-
way is liable to human beings and cattle so falling therein or
coming in contact therewith. 16
owner of property, even if present, is not bound to warn a mere licensee
of a danger of which he has no reason to believe that the licensee is
ignorant. It does not align the Minnesota Court with those jurisdictions
which hold that an owner may without liability allow a person, who enters
his premises relying upon the permission extended to him, to stumble un-
awares into a danger which the owner knows the licensee neither expects
nor is likely to observe, and of whose presence the owner could without
undue trouble warn him. As to this, see Bohlen, Landowner's Duty to
Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right (1921) 69 U. PA. L.
REv. 340, 353-6, and compare with the cases cited therein Habina v. Twin
City Gen. Elec. Co. (1907) 150 Mich. 41, 113 N. W. 586, and Martin v.
Louisville etc. Bridge Co. (1908) 41 Ind. App. 493, 84 N. E. 360.
'4 See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 13, at 142, 237, 340; and Steinwedol v.
Hilbert (1925, Md.) 131 Atl. 44.
1 The courts show a curious tendency to speak of an invitee, who goes
outside of the area into which he is invited to enter, as thereby becoming a
licensee. See Mazey v. Loveland, supra note 13; and Powers v. Raymond
(1925, Calif.) 239 Pac. 1069. This may not be important in those juris-
dictions which deny that a landowner is under any greater obligation to a
bare "licensee" than he is to the most flagrant of trespassers. But it
ceases to be a mere error of form and becomes a matter of practical im-
portance in those jurisdictions which properly place upon an owner of
real estate the same duty to disclose any dangerous defect therein of
which he knows to one whom he may expect to enter in ignorance of its
existence, and in reliance upon the good faith of no matter how gratuitous
a permission to enter, as substantially all jurisdictions impose upon an
owner of a chattel who gratuitously permits another to use it. So too, it
becomes an error of substance in a jurisdiction which recognizes that an
owner who has given another permission to enter his premises for any
purpose must expect the permission to be utilized, and is therefore bound
to refrain from acts which may unduly imperil his licensee if he enters.
See Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 13, at 243, 248, 353-6.
16Barnes v. Ward (1850, C. P.) 9 C. B. 392; Ruocco v. United Adv. Co.
(1922) 98 Conn. 241, 119 Atl. 48; Smith v. Milford (1914) 89 Conn. 24,
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Even those jurisdictions which have not adopted the doctrine
of the turntable cases tend to recognize the common practice of
young children to make considerable deviations from the traveled
way, and require occupiers of premises abutting upon highways
to regulate their use thereof so as not to make such childish
deviations unduly dangerous. 17  Thus certain areas contiguous
to highways have become taboo to uses dangerous to children.
So too, the well-known tendency of cattle to stray is recognized,
at least in some jurisdictions, as casting upon owners of
property which abut upon highways the duty to keep so
much of their property as is immediately adjacent thereto
free from conditions unnecessarily dangerous to cattle." But
neither adult nor child wayfarers nor the owners of livestock
lawfully in a highway are entitled to find the adjacent premises
absolutely safe for their unavoidable or innocent deviations. They
are only entitled to find the premises reasonably safe; and in de-
termining whether the occupier is, or is not, keeping his premises
in a reasonably safe condition for such deviations, the occupier's
interest in the use of his premises is to be weighed against the
danger to travelers, old and young.
In the cases in which the owner has been held liable, the dan-
gerous condition, generally an e-xcavation though sometimes a
structure or appliance erected or maintained upon the premises,
was not necessary to the owner's use of his property, or it was not
necessary to maintain it at a point adjacent to the highway or in
the condition which made it dangerous-or, if necessary at that
point and in that condition, it might have been made innocuous
by guards or railings without substantially interfering with its
utility. 9 Even a use of the premises whose dangerous effects
92 Atl. 675. See also Beck v. Cartcr (1877) GS N. Y. 233; Murph~y v.
Bolger (1888) 60 Vt. 23; contra: Howland v. Vinzccnt (18M) 51 Mass. 371.
There is some difference of opinion as to what constitutes an unavoid-
able and so an innocent deviation by an adult traveler and the propinquity
of the dangerous condition to the highway which is requisite to create lia-
bility. See (1924) 38 HARV. L. Rnv. 265. It is not necessary to discuss
these questions. In the few cases in which adult travelers have been
injured by barbed wire or spiked railings, the facts were such as to bring
the case within the narrowest view on both points.
17 Cf. Ruocco V. United Adv. Co., supra note 1G. In Grogan v. Sclclc
(1885) 53 Conn. 186, 1 Atl. 899, the plaintiff was injured by falling into
an unguarded area adjoining the public highway. The court in holding
the defendant liable emphasized the fact that the paving of the area in
the defendant's yard was of the same material as that used in paving the
sidewalk so that as a result the fence line was not indicated. This, said
the court, constituted an allurement. See also Dzffey v. Sable Iron Worl-a
(1904) 210 Pa. 326, 59 Atl. 1100; Birge v. Gardht cr (1849) 19 Conn. 500.
IsPowell v. Salsbury (1828, Exch.) 2 Y. & J. 391; ef. Saxton v. Bacon,
(1859) 31 Vt. 540.
39Lepnick v. Gaddis (1894) 72 Miss. 200, 16 So. 213; Orcrholt v. Victl?3
(1838) 93 Mlo. 422, 6 S. W. 74. See Dobbins v. Missouri R. R. (1397) 91
Tex. 60, 65, 41 S. W. 62, 64.
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extend beyond the premises themselves and render travel dan-
gerous to wayfarers who confine themselves to the highway
is not unreasonable if the use is one which is essential
to the occupier's business and is so conducted as to create no
unnecessary danger. 20 In none of the cases in which the occupier
of premises abutting upon a highway was held liable, was the
dangerous condition maintained by the owner of the property as
a means of protecting it from intrusion. And it is submitted
that no distinction can be drawn between a condition which is
necessary for the protection of the premises from intrusion and
a condition which is necessary for the owner's business or other
use of his premises.
But in the one case as in the other the condition must be not
only necessary to serve the occupier's purposes, but it must be so
constructed as to contain no dangers which are not necessary
to accomplish that purpose. A barbed wire fence properly strung
necessarily contains some risk of injury to persons or cattle
who come in contact with it. But the injury which a
fence so constructed can do is comparatively trivial. The pres-
ence of a railing gives warning of the existence of the fence and
prevents it from operating as a trap or hidden danger,:1 even to
a child, if old enough to travel unattended, or to livestock. This,
together with the slight chance of innocent deviation, makes the
total risk insignificant as compared with the occupier's interest
in preserving his property from intrusion, which he cannot other-
wise effectively do. If, however, a barbed wire fence is so loosely
strung as to make it likely to entangle either human beings or
cattle, the injury which it threatens is seriously increased. The
absence of a top railing or the excessive distance between the
posts to which it is strung may prevent either children or cattle
from observing it, and so lead them unwittingly to come in con-
tact with it in the course of their innocent, though intentional and
perhaps technically illegal, deviations. There are, therefore, many
cases which hold that owners of property are liable to the owners
20 See Wolf v. Des Moines Elevator Co. (1905) 126 Iowa, 659, 98 N. W.
301, 102 N. W. 517.
21 Some of the statutes regulating the erection of barbed wire fences
along highways provide that the fence must be topped by a board of a
certain thickness. See N. C. Sts. 1895, ch. 85. This is obviously not so
much for the purpose of protecting human beings unintentionally and un-
avoidably deviating from the highway as to apprise cattle driven or
lawfully straying along it of the existence of the fence into which they
might otherwise stray and injure themselves. On the other hand, the
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the use of barbed wire upon fences
adjacent to the highway except at the height of six feet or more, is
clearly intended to protect human travelers as well as cattle. See Mass.
Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 86, sec. 6; Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 5130. In
Kentucky by statute the owner of adjacent land may prevent the erection
of a barbed wire devision fence. See Carrol's Ky. Sts. (6th ed.) sec. 1784.
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of cattle injured by barbed wire fences so strung as to involve
an unnecessary danger; but the cases which so hold all directly
or inferentially recognize a privilege to use a barbed wire fence
so constructed as to do a minimum of harm and to give a maxi-
mum of warning.
22
The privilege to use a slightly dangerous device for the purpose
of preventing intrusions without liability to persons who are not
intruders, and whom therefore the devices are not intended to
affect, is closely analogous to the privilege of defending oneself
against another's attack without liability to a third party unin-
tentionally injured by one's' self-defensive act.2-3 In such a case
the defendant is not liable to a third party whom he does not
intend his self-defensive act to affect unless under all the circum-
stances he should realize that his act creates not only a proba-
bility, but an undue one, of causing injury to the third party. It
is not enough that the means of defense creates some such proba-
bility. The probability must be undue. The exigency in which
the defendant is placed by the attack and the value of his interest
in bodily security, which he is protecting by his action, is to be
considered in determining whether the means of defense which
he selects is, or is not, improper."
Thus a man who, without any necessity of so doing, fires a
revolver along a vacant city street, would undoubtedly be held
22Hurd v. Lacey (1890) 93 Ala. 427, 9 So. 378; Foster v. Surope (189)
41 Mo. App. 137; Sisk v. Cru2zp (18S7) 112 Ind. 504, 14 N. E. 381. Cf.
Loveland v. Gardner (1889) 79 Calif. 317, 21 Pac. 76G.
In all the cases which have absolved occupiers of property from lia-
bility for injuries caused by barbed wire fences, there is constant ref-
erence to the fact that such fences are in customary use. Occasional ref-
erence is made to the fact that if these fences involve any danger it is
danger not only to persons or livestock who come in contact with then
from without but also to persons and livestock coming in contact with
them from within. The fact that the owners of the property consider the
peril so slight that they do not hesitate to expose themselves and their
own livestock to it is regarded as showing that the common consensus of
opinion holds them not to be unreasonably dangerous. See Colo. Comp.
Sts. 1921, see. 3133, where the definition of a lawful fence specifically in-
cludes one made with barbed wire.
SC f. Morris v. Platt (1864) 32 Conn. 75; Paxton v. Boycr (1873) 67 II.
132; Pollock, Torts (11th ed. 1920) ch. 4, sec. 12.
- In Kelly v. Bennett (1890) 132 Pa. 218, 19 Atl. 69, the only case in
which a traveler was injured by falling against a spiked railing, the
plaintiff slipped upon an icy sidewalk, and in trying to break his fall,
put out his hand which was impaled on the spikes of a railing vhich the de-
fendant had put up to guard his areaway. In reversing a judgment for
the plaintiff, Paxson, C. J., said: "The railing was a lawful structure.
The defendant had a right to protect his area in this manner. Had he
not done so and someone had been injured, there would have been more
reason for charging him with negligence. It has been said, however, that
it should have been constructed without points. This is not so clear. The
points are useful in preventing mischievous boys from climbing over."
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liable if the bullet struck a person suddenly appearing from a
doorway or intersecting street. But if he were defending him-
self against a murderous attack, he would undoubtedly not be
held liable if the bullet went astray and instead of striking his
assailant, struck a person who thus suddenly and unexpectedly
came upon the scene.
It is certainly worthy of notice that only two cases have been
brought before an appellate court in which intruders have been
injured by moderately dangerous fences or devices. No case has
been so brought in which a licensee or privileged intruder has been
injured by such means; and of the cases in which injury has been
done to persons or animals lawfully traveling upon a highway
only two have been cases in which the injuries have been per-
sonal.2 5 In one of these the plaintiff was thrown from his horse
which shied into a barbed wire fence and was made uncontroll-
able by the pain of the wounds which the fence inflicted upon it.20
The most usual cases in which the liability for the negligent con-
struction of such barbed wire fences has been considered have
been cases in which cattle, lawfully straying or driven upon a
highway, have become entangled in the loosely strung wires
thereof.2  In view of the constant use of such devices and the
small number of cases of injury to human beings or even to ani-
mals, it seems rash to regard such fences as containing any con-
siderable element of danger.
II.
Save in a few jurisdictions, it is consistently held that a pos-
sessor of property is not privileged directly and in person to kill
or maim to protect his property from injury or destruction, much
less to protect it from mere harmless intrusion.28  Indeed, he is
not privileged to do so even to prevent himself from being dis-
He also points out the extreme improbability of such an accident and
the great number of circumstances which must concur to bring it about.
In this case, therefore, all the elements for the privileged use of such a
protection appear. The railing was necessary not only to protect the
premises from intrusion, but to protect the traveling public, which it
could not do if it had been erected anywhere else. There was, therefore,
no question as to the propriety of its location. The points which made
the plaintiff's injury possible were a reasonable means of preventing the
intrusion of mischievous boys; and the danger to legitimate travel was
negligible.
25 Kelly v. Bennett, supra note 24; Worthington v. Wade (1891) 182 Tex.
26, 17 S. W. 520.
26 Worthington v. Wade, supra note 25.
27 See the cases cited supra note 22.
28 Grigsby v. Commonwealth (1913) 151 Ky. 496, 152 S. W. 580; Bloom
v. State (1900) 155 Ind. 292, 58 N. E. 81; Gardiner v. Thibodcau (1859)
14 La. Ann. 742; Harrison v. State (1854) 24 Ala. 67; of. Simpsog v. State
(1877) 59 Ala. 1.
THE PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT PROPERTY
possessed of any property, real or personal, * other than his dwell-
ing place2 In Ilott v. Wilkes,31 the Court of King's Bench made
absolute a rule to enter a non-suit against a plaintiff who, with
knowledge that the defendant had placed spring guns in his
woods, trespassed upon the woods and was injured by a spring
gun upon the wire of which he had accidentally trod. But the
court admitted that one who sees another trespassing upon his
land gains no privilege personally and directly to shoot the tres-
passer by announcing his intention to do so if the trespasser per-
sisted in his trespass.
It is difficult to see why a trespasser should take any greater risk
of injury from a spring gun set for the very purpose of injuring
him, if he intrudes, than he is required to take of being shot by
the owner who threatens to shoot him if he intrudes and shows
every sign of a fixed intention to carry out his threat. The
trespasser knows that by his own act he is exposing himself to
the danger of being shot by the spring gun, but that catastrophe
he means and hopes to avoid. The chance of avoiding wires
which set off the spring gun is not appreciably less than the
chance that the owner of the property will at the last moment
relent. It is idle to seek refuge in the fiction that one cannot
expect that another will do a criminal or wrongful act32 What-
ever may once have been the attitude of Anglo-American courts,
there is at present a distinct tendency to hold that even criminal
misconduct is sometimes to be anticipated and provided against,
and this even when the intention to commit it is not known.C
3
Apart from this, it is consistently held that one who puts him-
self in a position of danger, however wrongfully, does not thereby
forfeit all right to safety. It has never been held that contribu-
tory fault, whether of inadvertence or of deliberate choice to
29 See Stacey v. Commonwealth (1920) 189 Ky. 402, 407, 225 S. W. 37, 39.
so In re Hussey (1924, Eng.) 18 Cr. App. 160.
31 (1820, K. B.) 3 B. & Aid. 304.
In Bird v. Holbrook (1828 C. P.) 4 Bing. 628, the Court of Common
Pleas was confronted with a situation which was discussed, without any
definite expiession of opinion, by the court in Ilott v. Wil1:cs.- In that
case the plaintiff, while trespassing on the defendant's garden in search
of his fowl, was injured by a spring gun which the defendant had set
therein without giving any warning of its presence. The court held that
the plaintiff should recover. The opinion of Chief Justice Best, who tooL-
part in the decision of Ilott v. Wilkes, regards the absence of notice as of
principal importance as showing that the spring guns were not "set for
the purpose of deterring" trespassers, but "for the purpose of doing
injury" to anyone who might trespass upon his garden.
32 See Beale, Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 HAnv. L. Buy.
633, 650; Bohlen, Contributory Negligence (1908) 21 HAMR. L. REV. 233, 236.
33Hall 'v. Smathers (1925, N. Y.) 148 N. E. 654; Mitchcll v. Churchea
(1922) 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6; Hines v. Garrett (1021) 131 Va. 12,
108 S. E. 690; Brower v. New York Cent. Ry. (1918) 91 N. J. L. 190, 103
Atl. 166; Paterson v. Norris (1914, K. B. Div.) 30 T. L. B. 393.
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encounter unnecessarily a known danger, is a defense against
one who takes advantage of ,another's carelessness or temerity to
inflict an intentional injury upon him.3 4 A trespasser, even if he
knows of the setting of spring guns, is merely braving a danger
and is not deliberately encountering a certainty of injury. His
trespass expresses no such willingness to be injured as to make
it amount to the giving of consent/theretoA"
If the owner is privileged to act, a warning given in advance
may possibly supply the place of a warning given immediately
before action; but it can give no privilege to commit so gross an
excess of privilege as that of shooting in defense of a mere
property interest less than the interest in the possession of a
dwelling place.38 It is more than doubtful whether it is, as is
sometimes supposed, a principle of the common law that one may
not do indirectly that which he may not do directly. As has been
seen, barbed wire fences, spiked railings and devices whose
probable effect is to frighten rather than hurt, or at most to
inflict merely trivial harm, may be used without liability even
though the trespasser injured thereby has no harmful purpose,
and the owner, if he were present in person, would not be priv-
ileged to inflict even' so trivial an injury upon him. The
danger that such a fence or device may inflict a bodily harm
slightly in excess of that which the owner might inflict, if he
were present in person, is counterbalanced by the impracticability
of otherwise protecting the property from intrusions, whether
harmless or harmful.
The decision in Illot v. Wilkes aroused such a storm of protest
in England37 that it was abrogated seven years later by a stat-
34 See Bohlen, le. cit. supra note 32.
35 This is the thought of Salmond in his criticism of Ilott v. Wilkes. "It
seems an anomalous and incorrect application of the maxim 'volenti non
fit injuria'. If a man intentionally shoots me, am I debarred from an ac-
tion because I knew of his intention and faced the risk? Am I guilty of
contributory negligence and so deprived of redress because I fail to take
sufficient care to avoid a mischief which another has wilfully sought to
inflict upon me?" See Salmond, Torts (6th ed. 1924) 453.
30 In addition, or perhaps as an elaboration of the argument that the
plaintiff took upon himself the risk of injury when he trespassed upon
the defendant's wood knowing that spring guns were set therein,
Holroyd, J., says at page 314-315, "If the plaintiff had express notice that
spring guns were placed on the premises which he unlawfully entered
• the act of firing off the gun; which was the cause of the injury,
was his act and not the act of the person who placed the guns there,
although this would not be so if the plaintiff had not known that the gun
had been set." A similar thought is expressed by Alderson, B., in Jord,
v. Crump (1841, Exch.) 8 M. & W. 782, at 788. The fallacy of this argu-
ment is sufficiently exposed by Butler, J., in Johnson v. Patterson (1840)
14 Conn. 1, 8-9.
37 See 10 Campbell, Lives of the Chancellors (1875) 63. See (1824) 35
EDINBURGH REV. 123, 410.
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ute-s making it a misdemeanor to set spring guns with intent
to destroy human life or inflict grievous bodily harm upon a
trespasser or other person coming in contact therewith.
The responsibility of an occupier of property for injuries to a
trespasser or other person entering his property caused by spring
guns was not considered in America until 1832. In the first
case- in which the question was considered, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky refused to give consent or dissent to the principles an-
nounced by the court in Ilott v. Wilkes therein, but its language
seems to indicate that the English statute restrained the use of
spring guns within "due and proper" bounds. In Johnzso v.
Patterson,, 0 the Supreme Court of Connecticut repudiated the
doctrine bt toto as arising from the same spirit and being part of
the same system as the game laws of England which have long
been considered by many of their soundest jurists as an anomaly
in their admirable system of municipal jurisprudence and as
being utterly inapplicable to this country.
No American case has sanctioned the decision in Iloit v. Wilkes
to its full extent. No court has gone further than to suggest
that a trespasser, however harmless his purpose, is not entitled
to recover for injuries inflicted by a spring gun which is set at a
proper time and for the purpose of preventing a burglarious
entry if he knows of the existence of the spring gun and never-
theless persists in his trespass.4' American courts are unani-
mous in holding that a possessor of property is not privileged to
install spring guns or other mechanical devices intended or cal-
W3 (1827) 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 18. The act applied not only to sprin- guns,
but to any engine calculated to destroy human life or inflict grievous bodily
harm upon a trespasser or other person coming in contact therewith and
set with the intent of causing such harm, and contained a proviso ex-
cluding from its effect a spring gun, mantrap, or other engine set between
sunset and sunrise in a dwelling house for the protection thereof.
In Wootton v. Dawkins (1857, C. A.) 2 C. B. (N. S.) 412, the plaintiff
came in contact with a wire which caused a loud explosion by which he
was thrown down and slightly injured in his face and eyes. It was held
that to entitle the plaintiff to recover under the Act of 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 18,
it was not enough that the instrument was one calculated to cause alarm,
and that there was no evidence to show that it was calculated to destroy
human life or to inflict grievous bodily harm. As to the inapplicability of
that Act to instruments calculated to kill or injure only trespassing ani-
mals, see Jordin v. Cnimp, supra note 36.
. Gray v. Combs (1832, Ky.) 7 J. J. Marsh, 478.
-10 Supra note 36; cf. Simpson v. State (1877) 59 Ala. 1.
41 See Hooker v. Miller (1873) 37 Iowa, 613, 615 (spring gun cet without
notice to prevent trespassers from stealing owner's grapes; the plaintiff
was a person entering to steal the grapes); Grant v. Hass (1903) 31 Tex.
Civ. App. 688. The Texas Code allowed the taking of life to prevent, fntcr
alia, theft at night An occupant of land setting spring guns to protect
his melon patch is held to take the risk that the person coming in contact
therewith intends theft, and to be responsible to a trespasser innocent of
criminal intent.
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culated to destroy human life or inflict serious or grievous bodily
harm for the protection of his property from a mere trespass,
whether harmless or harmful. 42  They are substantially unani-
mous in holding that an occupier of property is so far privileged
to install such devices that he is not liable if they kill or maim a
trespasser whom the occupier, had he been present in person,
would have been privileged intentionally to kill or maim. There-
fore, an occupier of property installing such devices is held not to
be liable if the devices kill or maim a trespasser who enters with
an actual felonious purpose and whose entry the occupier, were
he present in person, could only prevent by killing or maiming
him.43
There is some conflict in the decisions as to the privilege to use
spring guns or other deadly devices to protect property from
felonious entry where the entry, though felonious, involves no
danger to life or limb. This conflict, however, is not based upon
any distinction drawn between the privilege to kill or maim to
prevent such an entry directly and in person and the privilege to
do so indirectly by mechanical devices. It is based upon a differ-
ence of view as to the conditions under which the privilege to kill
or maim to prevent a felony arises. 4
4 -State v. Beckham (1924) 306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W. 817 (defendant, set-
ting a spring gun to protect his soft drink stand which contained property
worth less than six dollars, held guilty of manslaughter for the death of a
seventeen year old burglar); Pierce v. Commonwealth (1923) 135 Va. 635,
115 S. E. 686 (defendant attached a spring gun to the door of his store
and the deceased, a policeman, was killed while "trying the defendant's
door." The court affirmed the jury's verdict of guilty of murder in the
second degree); State v. Green (1921) 118 S. C. 279, 110 S. E. 145 (de-
ceased, a trespasser, was killed by a spring gun set by the defendant in
an unoccupied dwelling place and a verdict of guilty of murder in the
second degree was affirmed.)
43 Scheuerman v. Scharfenberg (1909) 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335 (burglar
injured by a spring gun while attempting to enter the defendant's store.
Recovery was denied.); Gray v. Combs, supra note 39; of. State v. Beckham,
supra note 42; Pierce v. Commonwealth, supra note 42.
44 In many states statutory crimes are labelled "felonies" or "misde-
meanors" without any adequate discrimination between the moral or social
culpability involved, or their effect upon their victims or society. The
same crime may be termed a "felony" in one jurisdiction and a "misde-
meanor'" in another, and in the same jurisdiction the penalty attached to a
misdemeanor may be as great or greater than that attached to many
felonies. See Mikell, The Proposed Criminal Code, of Pennsylvania (1923)
71 U. PA. L. REv. 99, 102.
To attach such importance to a term so loosely used is to make legal
rights and duties dependent upon words, not upon facts or public policy. It
is as vicious an exhibition of the bad effects of the "jurisprudence of concep-
tions" as can well be imagined. The word is the thing. It of itself has
a magic quality which compels legal results regardless of the facts or of
the interest at stake. Is it not ridiculous to make matters of life and
death depend upon the mere whim of the legislative draftsman and to
subject a man to the risk of death merely because the crime which he
has committed is arbitrarily labelled a "felony" rather than a "misde-
meanor"?
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In the majority of actual decisions, it is held that an owner
of a building, forcible entry into which is either by common law
or by statute made a felony, is so far privileged to use spring
guns to prevent such entry that he is not liable to one entering
under such circumstances as to make his entry felonious. 5 On
the other hand, there is a considerable body of dicta and at least
one decision which restricts the privilege to use spring guns or
other deadly devices to the protection of an occupied dwelling
place where experience has shown that the presence of a burglar
Blackstone gives as the reason for permitting "deadly" force to be used
to prevent any felony-that all felonies are punishable by death; and
therefore even if a person committing or attempting to commit a felony
is killed, it is at most an anticipation of the penalty which he has in-
curred by his crime. See 4 Blackstone, Commetarics, 0 188. If this were
ever valid in England, it has no validity in America today when the few
felonies punishable by death rarely, if ever, include either common law or
statutory burglary. It is more than doubtful if even in England, and at
least in Blackstone's time, life might be taken to prevent every felony.
Even if every felony were punishable by death, the privilege, when its
purpose is to prevent a felony threatening injury to life or property, may
be exercised not only when life or property is in actual danger, but also
when it is reasonably, but mistakenly, believed to be zo. Whatever may be
said as to the justice of permitting the unofficial imposition of the death
penalty upon actual felons, it is certainly an extreme penalty to attach
to reasonably suspicious conduct to make the person unfortunate enough
to incur suspicion fair game for one who, however reasonably, misinterprets
his actions.
45 Gray v. Combs, supra note 39; Schczerman v. Scharfenbcrg, opra
note 43.
46State v. Barr (1893) 11 Wash. 431, 39 Pac. 1030; cf. Pirce 'v. Com-
rnwnwealth, supra, note 42; and see (1827) 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 18 (reenacted
substantially in (1851) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, sec. 4 and (1801) 54 & 55 Vict.
ch. 69, sec. 1, whereby the setting of spring guns, except by night in a
dwelling house for the protection thereof was made a criminal offense). See
(1922) 70 U. PA. L. REv. 334.
Certain text writers have taken the time-honored statement that "every
man's house is his castle" to justify a privilege to kill anyone whose intru-
sion into the actor's dwelling house cannot be prevented. See 1 Bishop,
Criminal Law (7th ed.) see. 858; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (11th ed. 1912)
sec. 634. These statements were based upon dicta in cases in which an
accurate analysis of the fact showed that the intrusion was either felonious
or one involving danger to life or limb of the inmates or both. State v.
Bradley (1925, S. C.) 120 S. E. 240; Hall v. State (1914) 113 Arl:. 454,
168 S. W. 1122; You22g v. State (1905) 74 Neb. 346, 104 N. W. 867. Prob-
ably due to the influence of these dicta and the text writer.' comment
thereon, there are statutes which provide that a homicide is justifiable if
necessary to protect real property from any intrusion (see Tex. Pen. Code,
art 680), or from an intrusion with any felonious purpose (see Utah Comp.
Sts. 1917, ch. 8032), or from an intrusion which is felonious, violent or
riotous (see 6 Parks Ga. Ann. Code, ch. 73), and for the purpose of assault-
ing or offering personal violence to the inmates of a dwelling house. See
Ill. Crim. Code, ch. 148 (Hurd's Ill. Stat. 1899, p. 595). But apart from
cases applying such statutes, it is the decided weight of authority, both of
decision and reason, that the use of weapons or force dangerous to life and
541
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involves danger to life and limb. This view seems on the whole
preferable. Whatever may have been the early common law, the
privilege to kill to prevent a felony has for many generations
been restricted both in England and America to felonies of an
atrocious or violent character. It is quite possible that if the
crime is so atrocious as seriously to affect the public interest even
death may be inflicted for its prevention. If the crimes are of
violence, such as were the great majority of early common law
felonies, they are usually committed by such persons and under
such circumstances as to threaten a very real risk of serious
bodily injury to their victims.
Even though the entry into an unoccupied dwelling house was
at common law a felony,7 and entry into various other unoccu-
pied buildings in which property is kept have been made felonies
by statute, they are capable of affecting only the owner's interest
in his property, real or personal. Such entries are, after all, made
felonious not because of the disturbance which they cause to public
order, but because they are serious invasions of property in-
terests and perhaps even more probably because they have a
superficial likeness to that time-honored category of felony,
burglary. That such an entry is called a felony cannot change
the fact that a privilege to kill to prevent it is, in its essence, a
limb is privileged, only if the actor reasonably believes that the threatened
intrusion involves a danger to the life or limb of some inmate of the dwell-
ing place. Bray v. State, supra note 3; State v. Countryman (1896) 57
Kan. 815, 48 Pac. 137; State v. Patterson, supra, note 3.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the traditional sanctity of the dwelling
place as the owner's castle and haven of refuge is of legal significance
only in that it permits one who is threatened with a murderous attack
therein to use deadly weapons in self-defense without retreat, even though
retreat could obviously be made with absolute certainty of safety and
therefore must be made if he were attacked elsewhere, and that it probably
permits an owner of a dwelling place to use such weapons if he cannot
otherwise prevent himself from being dispossessed thereof. In rV J. J.
Hussey, supra note 30.
47 It is not easy to understand why the forcible entry upon an unoccupied
dwelling even at night and with felonious intent was held to constitute a
burglary at common law. There is a fundamental distinction between such
an entry by night and a similar entry by day. The former is not only
less capable of detection and safe prevention, but it involves a danger of
bodily harm to the inmates far greater than that threatened by the latter.
But if the dwelling place is unoccupied, there are no inmates whose life
or limb can be imperilled. Indeed, it is not easy to distinguish even a
nocturnal entry upon an unoccupied dwelling house from a nocturnal entry
upon any other building in which the chattels are kept. The fact that
the dwelling house is unoccupied eliminates all danger to life and limb
of the inmates. All that remains is the possessor's proprietary interest in
the building and chattels, which is no greater than the similar interest
of the possessor of a warehouse stored with goods. The peculiar sanctity
which immemorial tradition attaches to a dwelling place, however, may ac-
count for the distinction between an unoccupied dwelling house and other
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privilege to kill or maim, for the purpose of protecting the build-
ings and chattels therein from injury, destruction or theft.13
It is difficult to reconcile so broad a privilege with the admitted
rule that there is no privilege to kill or maim merely to preserve
from no matter how serious an invasion any interest in prop-
erty, other than the possession of a dwelling place, if the property
is so situated that its invasion does not constitute a statutory
felony.4
9
buildings outside the curtilage of the dwelling place. But it may be sug-
gested that it is possible that the felonious entry upon an unoccupied
dwelling house was held to be a burglary because courts had lost sight of
the reason for regarding a nocturnal entry upon a dwelling place as more
criminal thhn an entry by day, and regarded the question as closed by the
fact that the premises fell within the traditional term "dwelling place."
There appears in the criminal law a tendency to regard the terms of a
common law definition as having the same force as the statutory definition
of a crime, and therefore to regard the question of the criminality of an
act as depending entirely upon whether the facts fall within the letter
of the definition. This tendency is more usually apparent in cases where
a court is reluctant to extend the scope of a capital crime beyond that
which the strict letter of the definition requires. In this case, however, the
letter of the definition seems to be applied to make capital an offense
which otherwise would be at most a misdemeanor.
4s In the case of Scheuerman v. Seharfenbcrg, supra note 43, the plain-
tiff, while entering the defendant's store for the purpose of stealing the
goods kept therein, was shot by a spring gun set for its protection. The
court, in holding that the plaintiff could not recover, called attention to
the fact that the burglary of a storehouse in which goods are kept for sale
or in deposit is made a felony by Ala. Code, 1907, sec. G415 (4417), but
also says, "a man's place of business (as the defendant's store in this
case) is pro hac vice his dwelling, and he has the same right to defend
it against entries such as burglary as he has to protect his dwelling place",
citing Jones v. State (1884) 76 Ala. 8, 16.
In Jones v. State, supra, the only point decided was that a man attached
with deadly force in his store might stand his ground, as he might if at-
tacked in his home, and defend himself against it with deadly weapons
even though he had a clear and obvious opportunity of safe retreat. In
the case of Gray v. Combs, sztpra note 39, the plaintiff's slave was shot by
a spring gun while attempting to enter the defendant's warehouse for the
purpose of stealing the goods therein. The language of the court appear3
to favor a very broad privilege to kill or attempt to kill for the protection
of property; but the opinion is based upon the fact that an entry into
such a building was by statute made a felony if perpetrated by a free
white man, although it was only a statutory misdemeanor if done by a
slave.
49 One of the methods which courts have used in emxtending the privi-
lege to kill for the protection of property is by liberally construing the
word "dwelling". Thus in Unzited States v. GiUiam (1882, D. C.) 25 Fed.
Cas. 15205a, the defendant was indicted for the murder of the deceased
who was killed by the defendant's spring gun while entering the goose
house of the defendant in the night time with intent to steal. The court held
that the goose house was within the "curtilage" and so the killing was
justified.
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Under the view which restricts the privilege to the protection
of a building used as a dwelling place, the privilege becomes
merely a form of the more general privilege to use deadly force
to protect the actor and others from death or serious bodily
injury usually threatened by felonious intrusions2O The tradi-
tional sanctity of a dwelling house allows any inmate to meet the
dangerous invader at the frontier and check the danger then and
there without the necessity of retreating or waiting until the in-
truder attempts to make so immediate an attack as he would be
required to do were a similar danger threatened elsewhere. 1
Upon one point the authorities are unfortunately vague. If an
occupier is present in person, he is privileged to use "deadly" force
not only to prevent an intrusion which is, in fact, burglarious
and which, in fact, he cannot otherwise prevent; but he is also
privileged to use deadly force to prevent an intrusion which he
honestly, though mistakenly, believes to be such.12 So too, if he
employs a servant or other deputy to protect his property in his
absence, he is not liable to an intruder whose entry the deputy
honestly, but mistakenly, believes to be burglarious and impos-
sible to prevent save by deadly force.
In State v. Green,5 3 the only case which has expressly ruled
upon the matter, it is held that an occupier setting spring guns
for the protection of his property, or indeed of his personal se-
curity, is not relieved from liability to an intruder who, in fact,
is not a burglar, but whose conduct in the light of the surround-
5o This does not mean that a man may not defend himself by force which
threatens death or serious bodily injury to his assailant against an attack
which threatens similar injury to him, even though his assailant's threat to
kill or wound him is conditioned upon his refusal to permit the assailant
to enter his dwelling or to rob him of his property. In such a case he has
an obviously safe opportunity- of avoiding the necessity of using such self-
defensive force by permitting the threatener to enter his dwelling place
or take his property. But while a man must normally avoid the necessity
of using dangerous self-defensive force even to the point of sacrificing his
dignfty by retreat, he is not compelled to relinquish either the possession
of his chattels or the exclusiveness of the possession of his dwelling house.
In re J. J. Hussey, supra note 30. So a man may not kill or maim to pro-
tect himself even against the most oppressive of unlawful arrests which
milder methods of resistance are incapable of preventing. But he may de-
fend himself against deadly violence used to accomplish his arrest even
though the threat of violence is obviously conditioned upon his refusal to
dubmit, and so he could avert it without danger to his bodily security by'
submission and therefore need not protect himself from injury by force.
Miers v. State (1895) 34 Tex. Cr. App. 161, 29 S. W. 1074; Perdue v. State
(1908) 5 Ga. App. 821, 63 S. E. 922; Coleman v. State (1904) 121 Ga. 594,
49 S. E. 716. But see State v. Cantieny (1885) 34 Minn. 1.
51 Brinkley v. State (1889) 89 Ala. 34, 8 So. 22. See Beale, Retreat From
Murderous Assault (1903) 16 HARv. L. Rn-. 567, 569.
52 Carroll v. State (1853) 23 Ala. 28; of. Harris v. State (1891) 96 Ala.
24, 11 So. 255. See 1 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 46.
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THE PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT PROPERTY
ing circumstances would have justified the occupier, had he been
present, in believing him to be so.
At first glance it is difficult to perceive why the occupier should
be protected if his human deputy reasonably, though mistakenly,
misinterprets the intruder's conduct, and should not be protected
if the inanimate devices which he has placed there to act in his
stead injure the trespasser under circumstances identically sim-
ilar to those which would have given him a privilege to do so.
But as the court in State v. Green points out, if the occupier
had been present in person and had killed the "intruder," it would
have been necessary for him to show not only that the circum-
stances were sufficient to justify a person of ordinary firmness
and reason in believing that he was in danger of losing his life
or of suffering serious bodily harm, "but that he himself so be-
lieved." The requirement that the occupier, or his human deputy
must so believe, is a very real protection to actually innocent and
harmless intruders. Unless the circumstances and the intruder's
conduct is such that no man, reasonable or unreasonable, could
help but misinterpret his purpose, there always remains the
chance that a human being present at the spot, nothwithstand-
ing the suspicious circumstances, would realize the true state
of affairs and recognize the intruder as one whom he would not
be justified in killing or wounding. On the whole, therefore, it
would seem that the principle announced in State v. Green is
sound.
Were it not for the fact that great latitude is allowed to a
householder in his dealings with an actual or supposed burglar,
it would seem that one setting a spring gun to protect his prop-
erty should also be liable if, in fact, the entry of even a burglar-
ious intruder could have been prevented otherwise than by the
operation of the gun.54 Granting, however, that the intruder is,
in fact, a burglar, there is less reason to be tender of his rights
and interests. If the interest in the security of the inmates of
an occupied house is regarded as of sufficient value to justify
protection by spring guns, the privilege to use them should not
be so restricted as to make their use ineffective or a source of
unreasonable responsibility. It is difficult to imagine a spring
54 "If defendant had been pei'sonally present and killed deceased under
the circumstances aforesaid, in order to sustain his plea of justification he
would have been compelled to satisfy the jury that he had used no more
force than was reasonably necessary in repelling the assault of deceased
in attempting to enter his premises to commit the crime of burglary, if
such was his intention. . . . Again if the defendant had been personally
present, and had killed the deceased with said gun, under the foregoing
circumstances, the jury, in passing upon the plea of justification, might
have concluded that there was no reasonable necessity for Idlling deceased
until the latter had, at least, entered the building." Railey, C., in Stato
v. Beckham (1924) 306 Mlo. 566, 575, 267 S. W. 817, 818.
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gun that will repel a burglar which may not act prematurely, or
upon a burglar who might be excluded by other and less dan-
gerous means. While the law should in every way safeguard
thosewhose intrusions are innocent of all harmful purpose and
even those whose intrusions, though likely to do harm, do not
threaten injury either to life, limb or property so serious as to
warrant deadly force in repelling them, there is no reason to pro-
tect actually dangerous intruders by restrictions which deprive
the householder of the possibility of effective protection.
In all of the cases in which a possessor of property has been
held liable to an intruder injured by a spring gun, the intruder
has been one whom the occupier, had he been present in person
and known the facts, would not have been justified in killing or
wounding; and in all of them the property protected from in-
trusion was either not a dwelling house, or if a dwelling house,
was unoccupied. In them the privilege to use such devices without
liability to even a criminal'intruder was based either upon the
fact that the building was a warehouse or a business office and
as such to be regarded as substantially the same as a dwelling
house, or a criminal entry upon such buildings was made a stat-
utory felony, often expressly called a burglary.
It may be that it is proper to require one who is privileged to
use "deadly" devices for the protection of such property even
against felonious entries to run the risk that it will operate only
upon criminal intruders whose intrusions the owner might per-
sonally repel by deadly force. It does not necessarily follow that
the use of such devices for the purpose of protecting the lives
of inmates of an occupied dwelling place should be exercised at
the same risk. After all, the situation is closely cognate to the case
where a man who is threatened with a murderous attack in law-
ful self-defense, by deadly force directed against the assailant and
not intended to injure bystanders, wounds a bystander.
The spring gun is intended to injure only burglars. The time
during which it is set is such that the likelihood of non-burglar-
ious intrusion is extremely remote. In such a case, it would seem
that there is room to argue that there should be no greater lia-
bility for injuries done to the unforeseeable though innocent in-
truder than there is to a person suddenly appearing within the
range of a carefully fired, but none the less misdirected, bullet shot
in self-defense against a murderous assailant. There is, however,
no basis either in decision or in judicial dicta for such a distinc-
tion. After all, the decisions which hold the occupier liable are
in jurisdictions which make no distinction between the privilege
to use deadly force, either directly or indirectly, to repel felon-
ious intrusions which are dangerous to life, and those which are
dangerous only to property. It seems likely, therefore, that
those jurisdictions which permit the occupier in person, or by
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mechanical devices, to apply deadly force to only those felonious
intruders upon an occupied dwelling house, whose presence therein
involves dangers to the life of its inmates, will accept these deci-
sions at their face value and will hold that the privilege to set
spring guns for the purpose of protecting occupied dwellings is
subject to the risk of responsibility for injury done thereby to
persons who intrude without felonious intent.
